Background

Father Louis Taparelli, S.J., (1817–1891) was a prominent Jesuit theologian, philosopher, and social ethicist whose intellectual contributions significantly shaped Catholic social thought in the 19th century. A native of Italy, he dedicated his life to academic scholarship and the promotion of social justice (a term he coined), importantly within the framework of Catholic doctrine. Taparelli held the degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology from the Gregorian University. His approach was an application of timeless scholastic principles to contemporary social issues and, unsurprisingly, he was a fierce opponent of enlightenment and liberal principles, both very popular in his day.

Throughout his ecclesiastical career, Fr. Taparelli received numerous honors recognizing his theological and philosophical contributions. He served as a professor at prominent Jesuit institutions and was the co-founder of Civiltà Cattolica, established in 1850 at the behest of Pope Pius IX. For twelve years he would contribute to the journal, considered a semi-official publication of the Holy See. His writings addressed pressing social and political issues of his time, advocating for social justice grounded in Catholic principles while engaging with contemporary debates on morality, politics, and society. Notably, his thinking was adopted, in large part, by Pope Leo XIII in his masterful encyclical, Rerum Novarum (On the Condition of the Working Classes), promulgated in 1891. Taparelli’s most important work, ‘Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appogiato sul fatto’, i. e. ‘A Theoretical Essay on Natural Right from an Historical Standpoint" (2 vols., 7th ed., Rome, 1883), was in a way the beginning of modern sociology. Today, his legacy endures through his writings, which remain a critical reference for scholars studying the development of Catholic social doctrine.

CHAPTER VI. Conclusion.

ARTICLE I. On the division of political powers.

From what has been said about political powers, it is easy to understand what judgment should be made about their distribution. Montesquieu claimed that there is no liberty when the same one who makes the law both executes it and judges its execution; and he claimed to demonstrate this assumption by the tendency that every power naturally has to aggrandize itself and invade.1 But he forgot the force of reason and conscience, which can well moderate that fatal tendency; and which, being the specific and noblest part of man, seems to deserve some place in the calculation of the driving forces of society. Now if this reason and this conscience are taken into account, it is evident that Montesquieu’s theory loses a great part of its importance and its evidence. Without wasting time in examining it in detail, let us present in a few words what is true in it, and eliminate what is false and absurd in it.

The first truth that presents itself is that the system of Montesquieu, which in his book seems to be an essential law of the social constitution, is really nothing but a particular way of satisfying the universal law of social justice, which requires that authority direct for the common good. Having presupposed this law as the first axiom, Montesquieu seems to add: it is impossible for a single person (whether physical or moral) to direct for the common good when he enjoys the possession of all authority, therefore authority or political powers must be divided. If instead of this universal reasoning he had said that in many cases the ONE abuses authority; therefore in many cases its division among many can be useful; he would have spoken the truth, and would have left the possibility of every political form subsisting. But his secret aim was to constitute the universe in the English way; and therefore he had to frankly admit two errors: 1. that it is not possible to have security under authority concentrated in a single person; 2. that authority cannot be concentrated in any individual or body.

I said the first mistake, because 1. in order for there to be no security under the united powers, it would be necessary that this union would by its very nature bring about an abuse of power: which if it were, it would follow that this abuse is necessary: ​​but it is not necessary, according to the confession of the adversaries themselves; therefore one can sometimes have security under united powers: 2. in reality one can have and does have such foundations of security, that one cannot morally doubt the habitual conduct of a person (whether physical or moral) even if he is endowed with all the power. And in truth who does not see in every family the child as very secure, even though the triple power is concentrated in the father?2 It is true that the moral security, by which the son lives peacefully under the paternal scepter, is founded mainly in that tenderness with which nature has given him; but whatever the reason, the fact is certain: and given the fact, the generality of the theory we have refuted appears fallacious. It may therefore also be fallacious in its application to sovereignty.

All the more so since in sovereign authority there may be found other bases of justice or interest, which compensate for what is lacking in tenderness, and reassure the subjects with moral certainty of their inviolability. And in truth if the instincts of blood are lacking in the sovereign, they are equally lacking in the subject: the subject is therefore more disposed than the son to resist, and here is one more reason for the sovereign to fear, the subjects are more numerous; the subjects do not depend in daily existence; the subjects are not to live together forever. . . . . how many circumstances are there to diminish the danger of abuse in sovereign authority, and therefore to morally reassure the subject in his habitual dispositions! How much stronger then is the sense of natural justice and beneficence in one who has no interest in offending to guarantee the subject! And I speak of habitual moral security, because under the government of men, that is, of free and sinful beings, no other can ever be found.

These rational principles are confirmed by the fact: that thousands of subjects are at peace under the most mediocre absolute government, precisely because they understand that the sovereign has no interest in offending them, and that not having it he will not offend them. In this regard Cousin observes that today absolute governments act as if they were constitutional (a truly honorable praise for them), and attributes this moderation to the influence of constitutional states. But to tell the truth I believe that both in constitutional and absolute governments moderation arises from the improvement of reason and education: since those governments also appear more moderate where the constitutional forms had in past centuries all the roughness of their era. Therefore, Montesquieu’s first principle is false, which asserts that there is no liberty where powers are concentrated in a single individual or in a single body.

And it is fortunate for us that the first proposition is false, since if it were true, all liberty would be dead, since a government is not possible where there are no concentrated powers, which is the second proposition that we have just criticized. Montesquieu assumes it implicitly, since without this supposition his whole system would fall to the ground; but this hypothesis is so contrary to the nature of society that the Author himself is forced to destroy it, assuring us that in the constitutional government the three powers will walk in concert.3 And in truth where would society be without concert, without unity? Where would unity be if the divided powers were not concentrated? Therefore the machine of division must finally return to unity, if society is to walk. Now does not this unity constitute a moral person, known by all under the name of governing society? And without this governing person is a society possible? Certainly not. Therefore if it were true that everything would be lost if the same body exercised the three powers4, all liberty on earth would be lost, since it is impossible that he who governs is not either an individual or a body. It may well be composed of many individuals or of many bodies; but it must always finally be reduced to unity, and therefore form a body.5

— But in this governing society of mine, in this one body, the functions are distributed in various separate organs. Now, Montesquieu might say, what makes civic liberty secure is that the powers, separated in this way, cannot be combined except when it is a question of something useful to all; and yet the common good will be secured. — Yes, the common good (or rather the benefit) of those who govern, who are always the smallest in number and the most powerful, will be safeguarded; but justice is a common good, and the benefit of the greatest number and of the weakest who are governed, this will not be secured by the division of the various powers in the various organs, but by the correct disposition of the wills of the governed.

I do not deny that the contrast between these powers cannot at times produce a good resolution; but I deny that this must always arise from the contrast; and that this contrast be limited to the division of powers proposed by Montesquieu: since I do not see any greater difficulty in the wicked collusion of thirty persons invested with all the powers, than in the collusion of these same persons invested with distinct powers: if therefore with all the powers in common they can tyrannize the weak,6 they will be able to tyrannize him equally by combining distinct powers.

The doctrine of Montesquieu in its generality is false; and for it to be true it must be reduced to certain particular cases, in which it may be useful to divide political power among many people. But could these cases not be reduced to some general norm that would give them a theoretical aspect, and make them an object of science? Yes, they could. And to understand it well, reflect that the theory of Montesquieu was born from having considered in government only the element of sensibility, and from having forgotten that of conscience: a child of French sensualism, the spirit of the laws was almost always limited to the material order, as we have noted elsewhere, and neglected, like the dream of beautiful souls, the moral element. Let us try to join both elements, and to attribute to them their just influence; and the formula of Montesquieu will have to change into this — THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY IF MATERIAL FORCE IS NOT SUBORDINATED TO MORAL FORCE — . Now this subordination can be obtained in two ways, namely 1. by making the possessor of material force voluntarily subordinate to moral force, that is to say to law; 2. by making sure that even against his will he must act in conformity with law. The first is obtained by establishing in the one who governs the light of truth and the rectitude of justice; the second is obtained by contrasting the evil influences of the passions of the one who governs with the reaction of other equal and contrary passions. There are therefore two methods of supreme political organization, analogous to the two great philosophical schools of idealism and sensualism, and to the two elements of the human compound from which these arise, spirit and matter. And since the perfect humanity consists in the right combination of these components in a single subject; just as perfect philosophy is in the middle theory that unites both elements, so perfect political organization is that where the two influences are correctly coordinated.

There is, however, a great gap between philosophical theory and political organization: theory discusses the truth, organization promotes the good: theory works as master over its own ideas, organization works on the wills of others as a simple governor. The first, therefore, when it knows the truth, can immediately adhere to it, but the second, once it has known the good, still depends in its operation on the accidental and precarious dispositions of the wills that it must move. Therefore, the philosophical theory will be correct when it conforms absolutely to the truth; but the political organization will only be perfect when, in addition to aiming at the good that it should be, it will also measure its forms with the forces that must produce it, considering them in their present state.

Hence it is that in a state where conscience has much strength, the conflicts of passions will be less necessary; on the contrary, where conscience is weak, the conflict of passions must be more balanced and vigorous. Now the equilibrium of passions is obtained more easily when each of them has in its hand a part of the sovereign power. Therefore the division of powers is all the more necessary in a state, the less the influence of conscience in its constitution is; and vice versa, the more the constitution of a state assures the influence of conscience, the less necessary will the division of political powers be in it.

— But why, someone might ask, why not establish this division of powers as a universal law, since it is beneficial? What harm would it be if in those peoples where conscience can still do much, the addition of this material impulse were to be found? I answer. Certainly from the rule we have just established, and from the fact we have observed elsewhere, it is evident that some division of political powers among associated men is not only appropriate by law, but necessary by nature, but it must be carefully considered that everything that is in accordance with the need for contrast is taken away from the unity which is the most essential constituent, indeed is the very being of society. The division of powers is therefore in itself a social evil, and does not become a good unless it is necessary to prevent greater evils. Therefore all unnecessary division is pure evil, nor should it be admitted in a perfect political order, and if we have just agreed that human society does not exist without some division, this is precisely because the imperfection of humanity will never permit an absolutely perfect political order among men.

Let us carefully consider and weigh with all the weight of our reasons the proposed doctrine and perhaps in it we will find not only the basis with which to resolve the problem of the division of powers, but also the explanation of the philosophical history of this problem.

— The question asked: is it necessary for the subject’s peace that each sovereign power be possessed by a different person? — The most general doctrine answers: such a division will be all the more appropriate, the more the sole possessor of the authority would be more subject to being led astray by passion. Applied to concrete sovereignties, what consequences does this have? 1. The sovereignty of the Creator is all the more perfect the more absolute it is. 2. The sovereignty of a wicked man is all the more upright the more bound it is. 3. The sovereignty of a man abandoned to his native weakness, and therefore more inclined to yield to passion, must abound in restraints and conflicts which he will continually strive to shake off. 4. The sovereignty of a man supported by natural means of education and supernatural means of religion will require fewer restraints, and he will more willingly impose it on himself.

This is how the theory responds according to the various cases in which public society can find itself.7

Now ask the philosophical-political history of mankind what were the events of the division of powers? You will see the emergence of one power in patriarchal society with the support of primitive religion and paternal tenderness. As religion declines, you will see the most intelligent and cultured nations tend toward division, not only in republics, but also in monarchies. A first division will bring calm to the nation for a time due to the contrast of multiple governors, but these, little by little, uniting their interests and becoming a body, will make new subdivisions necessary and will produce a perpetual democratic or rather anarchic tendency which, having reached the abyss, will provoke despotism. In the meantime, justice will emerge from a blessed land and will establish a perfect monarchy supported by the infallibility of a teaching voice and the sanctity of a law that governs indefinitely; but in the act of entrusting the triple diadem to mortal and frail man, he will temper its power with a tinge of aristocratic form.8 The peoples who will take part in this universal association, both by believing and by living, will acquire faith again in the possibility of a conscience conquering passions, and in the possibility of a government regulated by conscience, and behold absolute monarchies will arise again by consent of the subjects, who are inspired by trust in the prince and the religion they profess in common with him, and the common father (the Roman Pontiff) by whom the right (jus dicitur) is declared to princes and peoples, behold the rulers hoist the sovereign regulating Cross on the diadem and subject to a moral power, distinct from their own, the irresistible force of the sceptre: behold, in short, the era of holy Kings, of absolute power, of subjects devoted to the throne. But the successors will gradually withdraw, first by fact and then by doctrine, from the jurisdiction of the supreme pastor and from the voices of conscience, and the people will return to distrust and implore guarantees from the division of powers; and those peoples and those centuries who have protested most against the faith and against the sanctity of Christianity, those will be the most ardent in wanting to secure themselves by dividing and subdividing authority and every new past of those who govern will provoke new subdivisions, the execution of which force or even right may well prevent, but will not succeed in extinguishing the desire.

Foolish desire, if it hopes to find a trick by which he who can do everything in society has no passions; or having them, cannot satisfy them; or not being able to, does not even try to acquire new strength: a desire, however, not entirely unreasonable, if from new subdivisions one hopes only for some respite from the toil; if these subdivisions could spring from a sincere source of legitimate authority. But outside the religious system, how difficult it is for authority to want to divide and limit itself! In the religious system then (provided it is not pure theory but practice) what people will ask for a division of powers? If indeed the people are accustomed to making the power that they experience as most beneficial more absolute; and the sovereign, on the contrary, in fact divides the power which he enjoys in such fullness of right, yes by consulting before making laws, yes by delegating their execution, and yes by seeking for himself insurmountable barriers to some sudden transport.

Let us conclude then that the division of powers is the policy of fallen humanity, the unity of powers is the policy of uncorrupted humanity, the approach to the unity of powers is the natural course of humanity restored by supernatural virtue. The first, the effect of guilt and vice, is a principle of social destruction opposed to another principle of more prompt destruction, despotism: the second, the immediate effect of intelligent nature, is a principle of social perfection: the third, the effect of the present state of man, a mixture of reason and corruption, is a principle that can be applied in various ways, according to the perpetual oscillation that societies and individuals naturally make, now towards the reasonable now towards the sensible good.

And here, if I am not mistaken, is the true aspect under which the doctrine on the division of political powers presents itself in its universal form; very different, as everyone sees, from the narrow and limited form under which it was presented by the witty lawyer (Montesquieu) of the eighteenth century, too inclined to the material element, and therefore to local and momentary considerations, which in his day were dragging his nation too far into decadence.

This same defect caused him to limit the forms of division to three political powers only, by fixing himself entirely on that code, outside of which he believed he could see nothing but servitude. But from what we have said in the course of this dissertation, it is clear that there are four, rationally speaking, political powers that, if one wishes to combine in various ways these four elementary powers (constituent, deliberative, legislative, executive); and their multiple subdivisions (personal and territorial organization; remonstrance and inspection; civil and penal legislation; governmental, administrative, judicial, military power of a civic or political or warlike order), one will find room to study a great deal about the possible forms, and about the many and varied ones already in existence that are presented to us by ancient and modern history. Let us leave this study to the historian and the publicist: we shall have satisfied our purpose if we have theoretically presented a complete picture of the political powers, deduced from nature and not from particular customs and constitutions of this or that nation; and if we have proposed under its true aspect the theory of their reciprocal relation. And even if our intellect has not arrived at this, we shall at least be satisfied if in such dark regions we have raised a torch that is not treacherous, an invitation to more courageous minds, who are able to dispel the obscurity.

END.

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